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Abstract  
 
The article analyzes the fundamental issues of 
state evolution and typology. The authors justify 
that the state is an evolving phenomenon of social 
and legal reality. At that, it is shown that in the 
process of this evolution, along with the 
preservation of universal (essential) 
characteristics, conditioned by the nature and 
social purpose of the state, there is a modification 
of those properties and attributes that have a 
specific historical character and depend on a 
variety of factors that influence a state on an 
appropriate stage of development. The paper 
substantiates that the evolution of a state 
phenomenon must be considered in the context 
of general social evolution, which is, in the most 
general sense, the process of that intersubjective 
experience complication, accumulation and 
organization. 
The authors argue that any common (generic) 
concept of "state" is a conditional one to a certain 
extent, since it does not have a real ontological 
status, acting as the result of a series of 
typifications mediated by language and carried 
out in accordance with the relevances largely 
dictated by that practical life situation. 
 
 Resumen  
 
El artículo analiza los problemas fundamentales 
de la evolución del estado y la tipología. Los 
autores justifican que el estado es un fenómeno 
en evolución de la realidad social y legal. En eso, 
se muestra que, en el proceso de esta evolución, 
junto con la preservación de características 
universales (esenciales), condicionadas por la 
naturaleza y el propósito social del estado, hay 
una modificación de aquellas propiedades y 
atributos que tienen un carácter histórico 
específico y dependen de una variedad de 
factores que influyen en el estado de una etapa 
apropiada de desarrollo. El artículo corrobora 
que la evolución de un fenómeno de estado debe 
considerarse en el contexto de la evolución social 
general, que es, en el sentido más general, el 
proceso de esa experiencia intersubjetiva de 
complicación, acumulación y organización. 
Los autores argumentan que cualquier concepto 
común (genérico) de "estado" es, en cierta 
medida, condicional, ya que no tiene un estado 
ontológico real, que actúa como resultado de 
una serie de tipificaciones mediadas por el 
lenguaje y llevadas a cabo de conformidad con las 
repercusiones dictadas en gran medida por esa 
situación de vida práctica. 
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Resumo
 
O artigo analisa os problemas fundamentais da evolução do estado e da tipologia. Os autores justificam que 
o estado é um fenômeno em evolução da realidade social e legal. Nisto, mostra-se que, no processo dessa 
evolução, juntamente com a preservação de características universais (essenciais), condicionadas pela 
natureza e finalidade social do Estado, há uma modificação daquelas propriedades e atributos que possuem 
um caráter específico. e eles dependem de uma variedade de fatores que influenciam um estado em um 
estágio apropriado de desenvolvimento. O artigo corrobora que a evolução de um fenômeno de estado 
deve ser considerada no contexto da evolução social geral, que é, no sentido mais geral, o processo dessa 
experiência intersubjetiva de complicação, acumulação e organização. 
Os autores argumentam que qualquer conceito comum (genérico) "status" é, de certa forma condicional, 
porque não tem status ontológico real, que atua como um resultado de uma série de caracterizações 
mediadas pela linguagem e realizadas de acordo com as repercussões ditadas em grande parte por aquela 
situação de vida prática. 
 
Palavras-chave: Estado, Evolução do Estado, Estado, Sociedade Política, Poder do Estado. 
 
Introduction 
 
Evolution is an inalienable and the most 
important characteristic of statehood from the 
time it emerged to our days; nevertheless, the 
problem of the state historical development has 
appeared in the field of view of historians and 
social scientists relatively recently, namely, one 
and a half centuries ago. This circumstance is far 
from being an accidental and characterizes the 
spiritual climate of the modern era. 
The period of modernity was the time of 
revolutionary changes in the social life of the first 
Western peoples, and then of the rest of 
humanity. Social transformations of an 
unprecedented scale and intensity, which began 
in the 16th-17th centuries, reached their apogee 
during the bourgeois revolutions, which led to a 
radical transformation of social relation system in 
the countries of Western Europe and North 
America. The result of these transformations is 
an almost universal withdrawal from the 
historical scene of traditional, or pre-industrial, 
societies and the coming of the industrial 
(modern) type of societies instead of them. 
During the era of the New Time the state finally 
separated from society, having become a 
relatively isolated social institution with its own 
organization that does not reproduce any other 
social structures, an independent social purpose, 
and the principles of functioning (Spiridonov, L.I., 
2001). 
 
At the same time, a modern state, being a 
product of the rationalistic consciousness and the 
mechanistic cultural paradigm of the New Age 
epoch, was a well-established mechanism from 
the very beginning. It is worth noting that the 
idea of a state machine has become widespread 
not only in the West, but also in those countries 
of the East, to which Western culture exerted a 
particularly intensive influence (for example, in 
Egypt during the reign of Muhammad Ali). In 
general, if we turn to the analysis of the socio-
political and legal processes that accompanied 
the emergence of a modern state in various 
regions of the world during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, we can easily see that the main 
stimulus, the driving force behind these 
processes, was the formation and an active 
borrowing of rationalist models and ideas about 
the state, which had a significant impact not only 
on the western, but also on the eastern political 
and legal culture (Villalobos Antúnez, 2016). 
 
Thus, in particular, the attempts of state reforms 
undertaken in the Ottoman Empire throughout 
the entire 19th century, especially during the 
period known as the "Tanzimat era" (1839-1876) 
were dictated by rationalistic motivations. The 
most important legal acts of Tanzimat were 
executed with rationalistic ideas, especially the 
Sultan's manifestos of 1839 and 1856 (Hutt-i 
sherif and Hatt-i Humayun), as well as the 
Constitution of the Ottoman Empire of 1877, the 
style and content of which were very unusual and 
did not correspond to traditional Islamic ideas. 
The ideas of the inspirers of the famous "One 
Hundred Days of Reforms", conducted by Kang 
Yuwei and his supporters in Chin China in 1898 
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were equally rational. 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the scientific 
thought of the late XIXth - early XXth century 
was filled with the desire to see the focus of 
rationality in a modern state, the result of the 
creative activity of the human intellect (Ward L. 
F. 1883) or even some kind of a rational being. In 
any case, there is no doubt that a modern state 
in all its institutional manifestations is a 
historically determined phenomenon that, at the 
time of its appearance on the public proscenium, 
was the most expedient and rational response to 
those objective regulatory requirements that 
arose in specific social conditions for New Time 
(Kabasheva et al, 2017). 
 
Historical background and the strategy for 
the study of state phenomenon evolution 
 
The modern type of state is perceived 
traditionally as an absolute entity, which entails 
the confusion of state and modern state 
concepts. At the same time, the issue of the state 
evolution, its historical dynamics in this context, 
was not raised at all. Even M. Weber, who more 
than others did for the study of the historical 
dynamics of statehood, saw a famous standard in 
a modern rational bureaucratic state, an 
archetype of statehood as such (Weber M., 
1930). Meanwhile, the study of any state of 
antiquity and the Middle Ages, that is, a 
traditional state in our terminology, makes us 
rethink to some extent the ideas existing in 
science about the attributes that are necessary 
for a state as such. In a traditional state, such signs 
(territory, the rule of public political power, legal 
nature, the existence of a state organization, etc.) 
manifest themselves differently than in a modern 
state, which, in our opinion, is conditioned by the 
historical dynamics of statehood. 
All mentioned above is shown in an extremely 
graphic way by the example of an ancient polis 
state, which is still being discussed, whether it is 
a city-state or just a civil community that does not 
have any signs of statehood. Given some features 
of the policy, individual historians in general 
questioned the existence of statehood in the 
ancient civil society (Will E., 1972, Berent M., 
2000). The supporters of this point of view 
referred, among other things, to the absence of 
a clear boundary between public and private law 
relations in a polis, thus, as Osborne wrote, "the 
polis embraced politai in all their various 
manifestations" (Osborne R., 1985). At the same 
time, researchers have repeatedly expressed the 
idea that the policy has all the characteristics 
inherent in a modern state. This position is most 
consistently defended by M.Kh. Hansen, who 
believes that the polis in general does not differ 
significantly from a modern state, or rather, from 
its ideal theoretical model developed in the 
writings of modern thinkers (Hansen M.H., 
1998.). A similar opinion is shared by I.E. Surikov, 
who sees, for example, sovereignty, as one of the 
most important characteristics of the polis state 
of the archaic and classical periods. 
 
Many scholars, however, believe that the notion 
of sovereignty in general is not applicable to the 
ancient policy, as, indeed, to any other traditional 
state. In fact, in legal theory, as is known, it is 
customary to distinguish between internal 
(supremacy) and external (the independence of 
state power) aspects of sovereignty. And both 
external and internal aspects of it are connected 
with the territorial sign of a state one way or 
another. It is obvious, however, that the 
territorial feature had, for example, less 
importance for an ancient polis state than for a 
modern state, as was already noted by ancient 
authors (in particular, Herodotus and 
Thucydides). It is not accidental, for example, 
that no polis state had its own toponymic name, 
but simply referred to as "the people of a certain 
city" (in particular, the Athenian state is always 
called hoi Athenaioi, that is, the "Athenians") 
(Manville Ph. B., 1990). 
 
It should be noted that the ancient Eastern state 
was relatively unrelated to its territory. This was 
manifested most of all in the so-called civil-
temple community, in which historians see an 
analogue of an ancient polis. Thus, the Jewish 
diasporas, deprived of own "territorial" state in 
the VIth cent. BC., were crystallized in the form 
of such communities, which became the form of 
statehood preservation until the second century 
BC., when there was the revival of the Jewish 
state (Guthrie H., 1960). However, this example 
is far from an isolated one. In this respect the 
"posthumous" destinies of the Assyrian, Hittite 
and a number of other ancient Eastern states are 
indicative. The well-known and rather 
noteworthy facts are the attempts of the 
surviving heirs of these empires to revive them 
after the fall of political centers on the periphery 
(and even beyond) of the territory once occupied 
by the deceased state. 
 
At the same time, even with this, the states of the 
Ancient World paid relatively little attention to a 
clear fixation of their borders (and thus the 
establishment of the spatial limits for their 
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territory), determining them only when they 
come into contact with the neighbors equal to or 
superior to them in strength. One of the earliest 
(and most textbook) examples of this kind was 
the peace treaty concluded in 1296 or 1270 BC. 
between the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II and the 
Hittite king Hattusilis III which summed up the 
long struggle of Egypt and Hatti for Syria and 
Palestine. At that, the attention is paid to 
following fact in the text of the treaty, the record 
of which was made on the walls of a number of 
Egyptian temples: actually, one can hardly speak 
about territorial claims and territorial 
delimitation of two states. 
The Hittite version of the text only refers to the 
intention of Hatti ruler to follow the provisions 
of the "attested (?) Treaty, who was the king of 
the Hittites at the time of Seperer (Supilulium), 
and an equally attested treaty who was the ruler 
of the Hittites at the time of Mechenra 
(Muwatallah)," (Anthology, 1960), in the Egyptian 
variant, more attention was paid to the borders 
between states. But in the agreement, the fate of 
the subjects of both rulers who were hiding in 
the territory of another warring state and subject 
to extradition after the conclusion of peace 
between them was determined meticulously, so 
it seems that the position of these defectors was 
no less interesting (if not more) by the 
contracting parties than the resolution of 
territorial claims. 
 
This circumstance was noted by G. Jellinek, 
according to whom "the significance of the 
territorial element of the state in antiquity was 
not recognized" (Jellinek G., 2004). This thesis 
was recognized later in the writings of some 
historians who believed that such important signs 
of a modern state as the population and the 
territory received a rather peculiar embodiment 
in many traditional states that consisted (like the 
feudal state of Western Europe in the 11th-14th 
centuries) "of people and lands." This peculiarity 
of the territorial feature of the traditional state, 
the absence of a rigid binding to a strictly defined 
location, gave rise to very curious historical 
phenomena of so-called "nomadic states" from 
time to time, first explored by historians on the 
example of some ancient polis, and also nomadic 
empires that existed among a number of peoples 
of Eurasia at a certain stage of their historical 
development. A similar ability to move in space, 
according to L.S. Vasiliev, was also inherent to 
the cities-principalities of medieval Russia. 
 
All that has been said, in our opinion, indicates 
that other criteria, including sovereignty and the 
state apparatus, as applied to the states of the 
Ancient World, the Middle Ages, and also to the 
early New Times partially, should also be treated 
with considerable reservations, considering the 
historical specifics of these states. Proceeding 
from this, some foreign researchers tend to 
conclude that not only the signs of the state in 
their modern manifestation, but also the state is 
historically relative as a social and a legal 
phenomenon, arising at very late stages of social 
evolution. Identifying the state as such with the 
state of a modern type, they concluded that the 
state is a specific product of Western civilization, 
finally formed in the era of modern times. This 
concept was actively developed in political 
anthropology, whose efforts were aimed at 
"Eurocentric prejudices" disclosure in the 
perception of the phenomena and the 
institutions of the modern world (including the 
state) in order to discover their civilizational 
foundations. 
 
As a result, political scientists devoted a 
considerable attention to the evolutionary 
processes that led to the emergence of the state, 
trying to determine the place occupied by the 
latter in the evolutionary row of social and 
political institutions, and there was no unanimous 
opinion on this issue (Razuvaev N.V., 2011). 
Thus, according to the well-known classical 
concept by E. Servis and M. Salins, the political 
communities consistently go through four stages 
in their development, namely a local band, a 
tribe, a chiefdom and a state (Sahlins M.D, 1960, 
Service E.R., 1971). On the other hand, E. Evans-
Pritchard, whose ideas had a significant influence 
on the views of Service-Salins, distinguished five 
stages of political evolution, which seem to have 
universal, general historical significance: akefal 
communities, chiefdoms, city-states (nomas, 
policies), empires and states (Fortes M., Evans-
Pritchard E.E., 1940; Lyubashits et al, 2017). 
 
As you know, these, and similar schemes were 
later subjected to vigorous and largely unfounded 
criticism (Llewellen T.C., 1983). In particular, 
their one-line character was noted, unable to 
reflect the complexity of the evolutionary 
process adequately, which is (as in other spheres 
of society) multidirectional one and involving 
numerous branches and dead ends. In addition, 
criticism has caused the authors' desire to reduce 
the variety of factors that determine the 
evolution by any one or several permanent 
reasons (for example, to political complexity 
increase and the diversification of society political 
organization). Nevertheless, the very idea of the 
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fundamental identity of the state as such and the 
state of the modern type continues to enjoy the 
support of some political scientists, political 
anthropologists and historians. 
 
The position by M. Van Creveld is very 
characteristic in this respect, according to which: 
"A state, ... like a corporation, which is a 
particular case of a state, is a relatively recent 
invention. For most of the history, and especially 
during the prehistoric period, there were 
governments, but not states" (Van Creveld M., 
2016). Summarizing his research in this area, the 
author comes to the conclusion that a state as a 
special political organization arises in Western 
Europe not earlier than in 1300 and receives its 
final design in the period between the death of 
the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Charles 
V (1558) and the conclusion of the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648)" (Van Creveld M., 2016). This 
conclusion is based on the research of a number 
of historians, who also stressed the ethnonational 
character of statehood which distinguished a 
state in this respect as a nation from empires that 
are universal (supranational) in nature and 
therefore which are not states (Eisenstadt S.N., 
1963). 
 
Main part 
 
The very word "state" appeared, at least in 
European languages, relatively late, not earlier 
than in the 16th-17th centuries. At that, in 
classical languages, the words that are usually 
translated as "state" (Greek oί, Latin 
civitas, res publica) in no way designate a state as 
an institution, they should rather be translated as 
a "community", "the unification of people", i.e., a 
community that acts as a collective. It is no 
accident that in English the analogue of civitas and 
res publica is not state, but a commonwealth, as 
evidenced, for example, by unambiguous 
instructions in the writings by T. Hobbes and J. 
Lock (Skinner Q., 2002). 
 
The specifics of the ancient understanding of the 
state have relatively recently become the subject 
of research by L. L. Kofanov, who drew attention 
to the polysemicity of the meaning of the term 
res publica, which, in his opinion, can 
simultaneously be used to designate both a state 
and a state property (Kofanov L.L., 2006). 
Referring to the famous definition of Cicero (Cic. 
De republ., I, 35, 39) res publica (est) res populi, 
L.L. Kofanov notes that: "Under the word "res" 
Cicero meant not only the state structure, the 
laws, the authorities of the Roman people, but 
also its property, public property" (Kofanov L.L., 
2006). Thus, there is, roughly speaking, a private 
legal nature of the term "res publica" 
interpretation in Roman law and legal thought, 
perceived from Cicero, who introduced the 
corresponding term into circulation (Mancuso 
G., 1995). 
 
As for the European counterparts, the word 
"state" (Fr. - etat, German - Staat, English - state, 
Italian - lo stato, Spanish - edad), they all do not 
go back to res publica, but to lat. status, originally 
denoting a legal status of a person and having a 
private legal significance (it is no accident in the 
Roman legal sources where this word is used, it 
was not applied to public entities sometimes, but 
to individuals only). Only in the XIIIth century, 
within the conditions of estate and class 
representation development, the word status 
begins to acquire a new meaning, namely, 
"estate" and at the same time "occupation", since 
only an inherent kind of activity was assigned to 
each estate in hierarchical medieval society. In 
such a picture of the world there was no place 
not only for the state in the modern sense, but 
even for the idea of its necessity. 
That is why, for a long time after its appearance, 
the word status was used to refer not a state as 
a public legal entity, but as private-law 
corporations, and this word denoted the 
corporations of representatives, usually with 
noble professions (doctors, lawyers, university 
professors, etc.). The latter circumstance gave 
grounds to Gaines Post to put forward, at first 
glance, quite an unexpected, but, on the whole, 
very plausible hypothesis about the origin of the 
term "state" (status). In his opinion, initially this 
term was used to designate one of such 
corporations, which for some reason was 
transformed into a political organization that has 
supremacy over private (professional and also 
other ones) associations (Post G., 1964). Perhaps 
this first occurred in France at the beginning of 
the fourteenth century, when King Philip IV, 
preparing to convene the General States (1302), 
in opposition to the feudal nobility, who opposed 
the involvement of representatives of the so-
called "third class" (tiers ètat) to the solution of 
state affairs", brought the university professors of 
law to himself, who formed his personal 
administration. 
 
It seems to us that the reason for the lexical shifts 
discussed above is to be seen in the evolution of 
the idea of the state that accompanies the 
historical dynamics of the state itself and which is 
its indicator. Such a dynamics in the countries of 
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Western Europe was due to a number of socio-
cultural, economic and political changes and 
included many processes that took place at the 
micro level. One of the factors that influenced 
the evolution of the West European state in the 
Middle Ages and the era of the early New Time 
is, as we know, the complication of the social 
structure of society. So, if in the XI-XII centuries 
there were only three ordines - aratores, 
bellatores and laudatores, i.e., the peasantry, the 
knights and the clergy, then in the thirteenth 
century about twenty-eight etats were 
determined. In Old European languages, the 
word "etat" was also originally originally identical 
to the Latin "status", but at the same time it was 
radically different from ordines. As J. Le Goff 
notes, this word is still missing in the "Book of 
Manners," written by Etienne de Fouger in about 
1175, it appears only at the beginning of the 
thirteenth century, marking certain shifts not 
only in the social structure, but also in the very 
world outlook of medieval society (Le Goff J., 
1964). 
 
However, the meaning of the term under 
consideration is not exhausted by the mentioned 
at all. It is noteworthy that in the medium-high 
German "stat" can also mean a land plot or other 
property. In this sense the word "stat" is used in 
the Saxon Mirror (13th century), where it is thus 
placed on a par with such words as "gut" and 
"lant". Similarly, the Roman legal sources used the 
Latin word "territorium", which could denote 
both the land belonging to an urban community, 
"municipia", and an administrative district, and, 
finally, the land plot that is privately owned by a 
person. The Polish word "panstvo", the Bulgarian 
and also the Russian "state" are close to this latter 
meaning. In other words, the meaning of private 
domination was originally embedded in the 
notion of state in the Slavic languages (perhaps, 
under the influence of the Byzantine 
ύ oκ , which was loaned into the Old 
Slavonic language, and into other Slavic languages 
through it). 
 
In addition, it should be noted that in Russian 
language the word "state" appeared rather late 
(Ingerflom C., 1993) and has been used for a long 
time exclusively in the meaning of "a country 
under the control of a sovereign", at least in this 
way it is defined in the dictionary by V.I. Dahl. In 
the "Dictionary of the Russian Language" by S.I. 
Ozhegov two meanings of the word state stand 
out: 1) a political organization of a class society 
and 2) a country with such an organization. As for 
the word sovereign (a nobleman), from which 
the word state derived, then, ascending to the 
word "the Lord" (*hosti-potes), expresses in 
itself the idea of property domination inherent 
also to this latter, including land ownership, and 
also people living on it. The same meaning this 
word has in almost all Slavic languages (compare 
Bulg. "gospodar", Serbo-Croatian "gospodar", 
Slovenian "gospodar", Czech "hospodar", Polish 
"gospodarž", etc.), and, as A. Zoltan points out, 
"a sovereign is a Slavic only in the sense of "a 
master, an owner," and not as the title of a head 
of state" (Zoltan A., 2002). 
 
All mentioned above testifies to the existence of 
a qualitative historical originality that 
distinguishes the traditional states of the Ancient 
World and the Middle Ages from the states of the 
modern type, which makes it impossible to fully 
compare traditional and modern states. At the 
same time, one can not agree with those 
researchers who connect the phenomenon of 
the state exclusively with the epoch of the New 
Age, qualitatively contrasting this phenomenon 
with the political formations that existed in 
traditional society. It seems that with all the 
weight and persuasiveness of the arguments 
cited in support of this point of view, this is 
hampered, not least, by purely logical 
considerations. 
 
In fact, considering a state only as the final link in 
the evolutionary chain of phenomena, one can 
not but conclude that this is logically a species 
concept (along with chiefdoms, polices, empires, 
etc.). However, species concepts, possessing a 
number of specific properties inherent in them, 
at the same time have, as we know, something 
common, in fact, and ensuring the existence of 
logical relations between them. Otherwise, 
there would be no reason to believe that the 
relevant concepts are connected with each 
other, and not with any other categories. 
 
Thus, the related species refer to the presence 
of a more general generic category, including 
them in its scope, thus giving to these species a 
formal-logical certainty that determines, among 
other things, their semantic difference from the 
species of a different genus. Such an 
interpretation of the genus-species relationships 
is already present in its embryonic form in 
Aristotle's "Classes," then obtaining its explicit 
expression in the comments of Porphyry and 
especially of Boethius, to who determined the 
classical definitions of "genus" and "species" 
(Boethius, 1996). Aristotle's theory also goes 
back to the idea that genus, in contrast to 
  
     Encuentre este artículo en http://www.udla.edu.co/revistas/index.php/amazonia - invest iga         ISSN 2322- 6307 
38 
species, is deprived of real being, being only an 
abstract "general characteristic," which unites a 
multitude of phenomena that have an 
independent logical meaning and ontological 
content. According to Stagirite, "the species is 
more of an essence than the genus, it is closer to 
the primary essence. In fact, if somebody begins 
to define the primary entity, [indicating] what it 
is, he will determine it clearer (more accurately) 
and closer by the indication of species rather than 
by the indication of genus" (Aristotle, 1935). 
All these considerations, as we know, had a really 
great impact on the further development of the 
philosophical, and through it, the scientific 
discourse. Having abandoned the realistic (in the 
medieval meaning of the term) interpretation of 
the categories of genus and species as having an 
independent being, which already in the days of 
Rosselin and Abelard gave rise to so many 
justified objections, modern science nevertheless 
did not go away from the once posed problem of 
the reality of general, including abstract ones, 
concepts and their correlation with specific 
phenomena in all the fullness of the individual 
characteristics of the latter. 
 
As to the subject in this study, this problem will 
look like this: first, can the term "state" be used 
to refer to not just one of the historically 
sequenced evolutionary phenomena, namely, as 
their common designation, that is, as a generic 
category? And, secondly, does this abstract-
generic "state in general" have all the universal 
attributes that are inherent in this or that 
cognitive value in the theoretical plan, or should 
the specific types of states and the specific 
characteristics that are inherent in them be the 
subject of theoretical knowledge? 
Proceeding from what has been said before, it 
seems that it is possible to give a positive answer 
to the first question. In fact, highlighting a 
number of evolutionarily interrelated 
phenomena and recognizing the very fact of their 
interconnectedness within the framework of the 
historical process, we thereby establish the 
commonality of these phenomena, allowing 
them to be viewed as different types of the same 
object of cognition, the self-identity of which 
manifests itself only at the highest level of 
theoretical generalization. In this sense, the 
category of the state as a generic term 
represents a certain universe, or a limited area of 
specific meanings (Schweitzer H., 1935). 
Moreover, these values, likened to each other in 
any one respect (most often corresponding to 
the goal and tasks faced by a researcher and the 
methodological methods used by him), need not 
have the identity in all other aspects necessarily. 
 
It would, however, be a mistake, in our opinion, 
to speak of the real existence of the "state as 
such" in its universally general sense, trying to 
discern a certain "phenomenon of social reality" 
in it, existing as an accessible one to the empirical 
perception of the object along with other objects 
of the surrounding world. This kind of approach 
faces a number of serious difficulties that it is 
unable to overcome. In particular, the scientists 
who adhere to a naively realistic attitude in the 
perception of the state often fail to explain how 
an abstract (generic) concept that the state must 
possess at all stages of its evolution agrees with 
the variety of specific historical manifestations of 
statehood, often having more differences than 
similarities among themselves. 
 
In other words, the reality of the state as a 
cultural universal is a special kind of reality, it is a 
product of the community member activities 
aimed at the organization, the construction of a 
common social reality based on a multitude of 
data of intersubjective experience. In this sense, 
the state is no different from other social entities 
(such, for example, as legal entities), whose 
reality in the unproblematic natural setting of the 
vital world is denied most often. The nature of 
such universals gets its fullest and most profound 
explanation in the context of phenomenological 
social philosophy, elaborated in due time by A. 
Schütz who saw the result of typifications in 
them performed via various (primarily sign-
symbolic) means. At that, the totality of such 
types is based on a system of intersubjectively 
relevant relevances, that is, the criteria in 
accordance with which the heterogeneous 
elements of experience are generalized and the 
social reality and its various phenomena (in 
particular, the state) are developed on their basis 
(Schutz A., 1970). 
 
In fact, any, including a single object, even if they 
assume the possibility of such existence in 
isolation from the set of phenomena associated 
with it by various kinds of relations in reality, this 
is already the result of a typing procedure 
application designed to bring together its 
multiple manifestations in an individual or a social 
experience of individuals. This sort of 
typification, the generalization of a multitude of 
diverse, often contradictory data of social 
experience, organized in accordance with the 
chosen criteria (relevances), is not only the state 
as a general category and not only all the specific 
historical varieties of the state. The result of 
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typification is also every single state with which 
society members encounter in their daily lives. It 
is no accident that M. Weber saw in the state as 
an empirical object only "an infinite number of 
diffuse and discrete actions and passive reactions, 
actually and legally ordered links, either individual 
in character or regularly recurring ones" (Weber, 
M., 1930). 
 
Consequently, the cognition of reality in general 
(and theoretical cognition as well) is nothing 
more than one of the ways of its organization and 
ordering, which is carried out using the 
typologies on the basis of a system of relevances 
chosen for various tasks. This system of 
relevances (and their corresponding types) has a 
multi-stage, hierarchical character that 
corresponds to the hierarchical structure of an 
organized reality itself. Moreover, each next 
stage of typing specifies and clears the typing of a 
higher level, which is more "abstract" in the sense 
that the latter includes a greater number of single 
values in its volume, setting the horizons of 
possible problematizations for all subsequent 
levels of cognition. This is how the movement 
from genus to species, from species to 
subspecies, classes and any other more particular 
typifications takes place, a movement quite 
comparable to "the ascension from an abstract to 
a specific," which is the content of scientific 
knowledge in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition. 
 
Hence the answer to the second of the questions 
posed above. Abstract and concrete, generic and 
species concepts not only in the epistemological 
sense (as the typifications of different degrees of 
generality) are interrelated and mutually suggest 
each other as the necessary components of 
intersubjective activity aimed at the organization 
of social reality. Being a kind of sedimentations of 
the historically accumulated social experience 
(and, consequently, knowledge as a reflexive 
refraction of the data from this experience), they 
can also be viewed ontologically as interrelated 
phenomena primarily in the context of the 
evolution problem which is of interest to us. 
 
Although a detailed consideration of this problem 
as such is not included in the tasks of this study, 
it seems possible to define it in the most general 
terms as the process of complication, 
accumulation and organization of that 
intersubjective experience, the elements of 
which form the matter of social (and also legal) 
reality in all its manifestations, including the state. 
This complication of the experience that occurs 
in the process of evolution makes the already 
existing typing inadequate, prompting them to be 
refined in the typologies of the following levels, 
forming all new levels of reality, respectively, 
called to fix its changes, that is, dynamics. At the 
same time, universal categories (generic 
categories, using the Aristotelian-Boetian 
terminology), created via the typing of the 
highest order, perform an important backbone 
function in its turn, since they fix the statics of 
social reality, as well as its various segments. 
 
A biological systematics can be an excellent 
illustration of this, describing the evolution of 
living nature and containing, as you know, eight 
hierarchically coordinated taxonomic ranks 
(domain - kingdom - type - class - order - family 
- genus - species). Each of them is a series of 
typifications, concretizing the preceding, higher 
and logically more abstract rank by describing the 
changes that occur with it in the process of 
evolution. However, neither the changes 
themselves nor the differences caused by them 
abolish the membership of certain taxa (which, 
by the way, are very far apart from each other 
on the evolutionary tree) to one common rank, 
and this common rank does not deny and dispute 
the differences that taxa acquire in the course of 
their evolution.  
 
It seems that the situation is similar in some 
respects to those categories in which social 
reality and its evolution are described. So, with 
the reference to our subject, we can distinguish 
the following levels of typification, differing from 
each other by the degree of abstraction from the 
features of the empirical material and reflecting 
the successive stages of movement from the 
abstract to the concrete in the process of a state 
phenomenon development. These levels are the 
following ones: 1) a state as a universal (world-
historical) phenomenon, which has a number of 
features that remain unchanged at all stages of its 
evolution and express the essential 
characteristics of statehood in itself; 2) the 
historical types of a state, formed by typing 
homogeneous relationships that are formed in all 
societies which are at the same stage of historical 
development; 3) the subtypes of a state (for 
example, western or eastern traditional states), 
typifying the relations that form in groups of 
societies which are at a certain stage of evolution, 
and therefore not only inherent in states of one 
evolutionary type, but also characterizing their 
local (regional) identity; 4) the types of state (for 
example, noma, eastern despotism, policies, 
empires, etc.), typifying the relations inherent in 
groups of states of the same historical subtype 
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with common formal legal and political 
characteristics; 5) specific states (in particular, 
Russian Federation) that typify relations which 
are formed in a particular society at one or 
another stage of its historical development. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Thus, any common (generic) concept, and the 
state is not an exception here. On the one hand, 
it is conditional one to a certain extent, since it 
does not have a real ontological status, acting as 
the result of a series of typifications mediated by 
language and carried out in accordance with the 
relevances, in many respects dictated by that 
practical life situation in which (and in whose 
interests) the perception of the world around us 
takes place. On the other hand, this 
circumstance does not make the generic 
categories less "real" than the species concepts 
they cover, or even single facts that fall under 
these concepts and categories. At that, the more 
this or that typification general, the more the 
number of the phenomena it covers differing 
from each other. It is obvious that these 
phenomena have their specific characteristics, 
which (as long as they are the characteristics of 
phenomena, so to speak, belonging to the same 
genus) should be regarded as historical 
modifications of these common (generic) 
concepts and attributes. The latter, being the 
basis of all concrete-historical types of statehood, 
manifest themselves differently in each of them, 
so that one can talk only within the conceptual 
level about their unchanged availability in any 
state. Nevertheless, in our opinion, the study of 
the state evolution (and, consequently, of those 
changes that occur during this evolution) should 
begin with the consideration of these universal 
concepts and attributes, not forgetting their 
historical and formal-logical content. 
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